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1 Introduction
Conﬂict and defense have historically played a central role in the determina-
tion of national borders. Historians and political scientists have extensively
studied "how wars made states, and vice versa" (Tilly 1992, p. 67), emphasiz-
ing that "modern states were largely built as military enterprises" (Colomer
2007, p. 33).1 Security concerns have inﬂuenced philosophical discussions
of the ideal size of a political system since classical times, when Plato wrote
that "the number of citizens must be suﬃcient to defend themselves against
the injustice of their neighbors" (The Laws, Book V).2Machiavelli claimed
that "the cause of the disunion of republics is usually idleness and peace;
the cause of union is fear and war" (Discourses on Livy,I I ,2 ) ,e c h o i n ga
view often referred to as "Sallust’s Theorem" (Wood 1995; Evrigenis 2008)
after the Roman historian Gaius Sallustius Crispus, who linked the internal
cohesion of the Roman Republic before the destruction of Chartage to "fear
of the enemy" (metus hostilis).
In modern times, military threats and opportunities have been singled
out as key factors in the formation of political unions and federations (e.g.,
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e-mail: enrico.spolaore@tufts.edu. Prepared for the Oxford Handbook of the Economics of
Conﬂict and Peace, edited by Michelle R. Garﬁnkel and Stergios Skaperdas.
1See also Bean (1973) and Tilly (1975). For a recent discussion of the literature on
warfare and modern state formation from a political-science perspective see Spruyt (2007).
2The philosophical and political literature on the size of political systems is discussed
in Dahl and Tufte (1973).
1Riker 1964), such as the United States, Switzerland, and Germany, whose
borders, as Otto von Bismarck famously stated in 1862, were to be decided
"not by speeches and the decisions of majorities [...] but by iron and blood."
In recent decades - especially aftert h ee n do ft h eC o l dW a r-d r a m a t i c
breakups of countries and increasing demand for separatism have renewed
interest in the formation and redrawing of national borders, not only among
historians and political commentators, but also within the ﬁeld of political
economics. A new analytical literature has been developed, providing formal
models where national borders are not taken as given, but are the endogenous
outcomes of decisions by agents who interact with each other while pursuing
their goals under constraints. Contributions to this literature include Alesina
and Spolaore (1997, 2003), Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000, 2005),
Bolton and Roland (1997), Bordignon and Brusco (2001), Ellingsen (1998),
Goyal and Staal (2004), Le Breton and Weber (2003), and others; overviews
are provided by Bolton, Roland and Spolaore (1996) and Spolaore (2006).
Several of these contributions have focused on peaceful border redrawing
through voting or unilateral secessions in the absence of conﬂict. A small
but growing number of studies, however, has begun to introduce conﬂict and
security considerations explicitly in the theoretical framework, therefore link-
ing the economic literature on endogenous national borders to the expanding
literature on the economics of conﬂict and peace, which is the subject of this
Handbook. In particular, international conﬂict and defense are at the center
of the analysis of national borders in Alesina and Spolaore (2005, 2006) and
Spolaore (2004), and are also modeled by Wittman (2000). A formal analysis
of civil conﬂict and secessions has been developed by Spolaore (2008).3
This line of work is related to other areas of research, such as the for-
mal study of conﬂict by international-relations scholars (e.g., Powell 1999),
and the economic analysis of military alliances, pioneered by Olson and Zeck-
hauser (1966). However, unlike more traditional studies, which have typically
taken the identity of states engaging in conﬂict as given, a central objective
of the new political-economy literature on nations is to endogenize (explain)
sovereign states themselves, and to study how their number, size, and shape
are aﬀected by conﬂict, defense and security.
Section 2 overviews some key ideas and questions about the relation be-
tween conﬂi c ta n dt h es i z eo fn a t i o n s . 4 Section 3 presents a simpliﬁed model
3A related literature has focused on the implications of internal distributional conﬂict
for the organization of jurisdictions (e.g., Wärneryd, 1998).
4In this chapter we use "nation" as equivalent to "sovereign state," as commonly un-
2that illustrates decisions over military spending, economies of scale in secu-
rity, and incentives to form alliances and political unions. Section 4 discusses
various topics on conﬂict and national borders in light of contributions from
the political economics literature. Section 5 comments on directions for fur-
ther research.
2C o n ﬂict, Defense, and the Size of Nations:
an Overview
2.1 The Fundamental Trade-oﬀ
What determines the number and size of nations? From an economics per-
spective, a fruitful starting point is the consideration of beneﬁts and costs
associated with a larger national size. A central role for states is the supply
of public goods to their citizens: a legal and justice system, security and
crime prevention, public health, protection against catastrophic events (such
as earthquakes and hurricanes), and so on. Providing public goods comes
with economies of scale. Typically, public goods, unlike private goods, are
non-rival in consumption: each citizen can beneﬁt from them without reduc-
ing the beneﬁts for other citizens. Even when the costs of publicly provided
goods go up with the size of population (say, because of congestion or increas-
ing administrative costs), some components of these costs are independent
of the number of users. In general, publicly provided goods are cheaper per
person when more taxpayers pay for them. Empirically, the share of gov-
ernment spending over total income is decreasing in population: states with
smaller populations tend to have proportionally larger governments (for a
discussion, see Alesina and Spolaore, 2003, chapter 10).
Defense and security have historically been among the most important
public goods provided by governments. Because of economies of scale, in
principle larger country can provide cheaper and more eﬀective security to
their citizens. Empirically, the relationship between defense spending and
country size is complex for various reasons, including the existence of inter-
national alliances and the fact that some larger countries may provide defense
derstood in English when speaking of international relations or the United Nations.
3for smaller countries, as the United States within NATO. At the same time,
larger, more powerful states may obtain additional economic and political
beneﬁts from their leading position.5
In summary, all things considered, the provision of public goods - includ-
ing defense and security - is associated with actual or potential beneﬁts of
scale.
A larger size, however, comes with costs as well as beneﬁts. Some of
these costs may be due to coordination and congestion problems that arise
when states become larger. More importantly, an expansion of national bor-
ders may raise political costs, stemming from higher heterogeneity in larger
communities. In particular, an expansion of national borders is likely to
bring about more heterogeneity of preferences for public policies and types
of governments across diﬀerent groups of citizens. As borders include more
heterogeneous populations - with diﬀerent cultures, values, norms, habits,
languages, religions, ethnicities - disagreements over the fundamental char-
acteristics of the state are more likely to emerge and harder to reconcile.
Being part of the same country implies sharing jointly-supplied public goods
and policies in ways that cannot always satisfy everybody’s preferences. At
t h es a m et i m e ,d i v e r s i t ym a ya l s ogenerate direct economic beneﬁts through
learning, specialization, and exchange of ideas. Successful societies manage
to minimize the political costs of heterogeneity while maximizing the beneﬁts
from a diverse pool of preferences, skills, and endowments. Nonetheless, all
other things being equal, heterogeneity of preferences over government poli-
cies and political costs tend to increase as states become larger and expand
their borders.
On balance, there is a trade-oﬀ between economies of scale and hetero-
geneity of preferences over public policies. Such trade-oﬀ has played a cen-
tral role in the economic literature on the size of nations (e.g., in Alesina
and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Le Breton and Weber 2003; Wittman 2000). When
economies of scale become more prominent compared to heterogeneity costs,
larger political systems are more likely to emerge. In contrast, a drop in
the beneﬁts from size or an increase in heterogeneity costs will bring about
political disintegration.
This trade-oﬀ has immediate implications for the relation between con-
5A further complication arises if the returns from foreign aggression are also increasing
in a country’s size - for instance, in its capital stock, as in Thomson’s (1976) classic analysis
of optimal defense spending and taxation.
4ﬂict and national borders. In a more bellicose world, when external threats
loom large and security concerns are paramount, larger and more centralized
political unions have an advantage in terms of defense provision. Conversely,
a reduction in international conﬂict, all other things being equal, will lower
the incentives to form larger political unions (Alesina and Spolaore 2005,
2006 and Spolaore, 2004).
2.2 A Few Questions
The trade-oﬀ between economies of scale in defense and heterogeneity costs
provides a useful framework to study the relationship between international
conﬂi c ta n dt h es i z eo fn a t i o n s .H o w e v e r ,i ti so n l yt h eﬁrst step towards a
theoretical and empirical exploration of this topic. The costs and beneﬁts
of defense and military power are diﬃcult to model and elusive to mea-
sure. They depend on strategic interactions among political actors within
and across countries, and entail complex relations with political, economic,
and institutional variables. While several insights have been gained on these
issues, the analytical study of conﬂict, defense and national borders is only
in its infancy, and key questions have only recently begun to be addressed
with the tools of modern economic analysis. Here is a selective summary of
these questions.
(a) Military power, economies of scale in defense, alliances and political
unions. Defense and military power are not standard public goods. Their
costs and beneﬁts depend not only on their provision within a given sovereign
state, but also on other states’ supplies, and, more generally, on strategic
interactions within and across national borders. For example, small states
can enter into various forms of decentralized military alliances, or merge
into a centralized political union. How do economies of scale in defense
and security diﬀer across diﬀerent institutional arrangements? How does the
possibility of forming decentralized alliances aﬀect the incentives for political
uniﬁcation?
(b) Endogenous political disintegration and international conﬂict. While
conﬂict and defense aﬀect the number and size of nations, changes in national
borders conversely inﬂuence the patterns of conﬂict and defense. In the
long run, conﬂict, defense, and national borders are all jointly-determined
5endogenous variables, and the change of these variables over time must be
studied within a general equilibrium setting. For example, what happens
to defense spending and observed conﬂict following the breakup of larger
political units, which perhaps occurred in direct response to changes in the
perceived importance of conﬂict and security?
(c) Conﬂict, democracy, and openness: implications for the number and
size of nations. The costs and beneﬁts of defense and military power may
depend on democratic constraints and international openness, as suggested
by an extensive literature on the "liberal peace," which can be traced back
to Montesquieu (1748) and Kant (1795) (e.g., see Oneal and Russett, 1999).
At the same time, the literature on the formation and breakup of nations
has stressed the role of variables such as democratization and economic glob-
alization, in addition to conﬂict and security. Nonetheless, the links among
conﬂict, democracy, openness and the size of nations remain relatively un-
explored. Do democratization, globalization and lower international conﬂict
go hand in hand with the creation of smaller states? Does the formation of
larger political unions is associated with dictatorial rulers, barriers to trade,
and a more bellicose world? Could we have multiple equilibria in these vari-
ables? How would societies transition from one equilibrium to the other over
time?
(d) Civil conﬂict and secessions. As mentioned above, while political
integration may bring about economies of scale in defense and better pro-
tection against external threats, an expansion of borders also tends to raise
heterogeneity costs within each country. An important question is whether
such heterogeneity is associated with a higher likelihood of civil conﬂict over
domestic policies, or even disagreement over borders themselves (e.g., sep-
aratist wars). A related question is whether a reduction in international
conﬂict may increase confrontation within each state. While there is an ex-
t e n s i v el i t e r a t u r eo nc i v i la n de t h n i cc o n ﬂict, much work still needs to be done
to understand the links between civil conﬂict, external threats, separatism,
and the endogenous formation of nations.
These questions will motivate the following sections. Some of the issues
under (a) will be illustrated within a simple model in Section 3, while the
questions under (b), (c) and (d) will be discussed with reference to the liter-
ature in Section 4.
63C o n ﬂict, Alliances, and Political Unions
We now present a simple analytical framework to organize ideas and illustrate
the basic logic of military spending decisions, economies of scale in security,
and incentives to form alliances and political unions.
3.1 The Basic Setting
Consider a world with three homogeneous populations (, ,a n d)o f
equal size (normalized to one). Each population is located at a vertex of an
equilateral triangle of length equal to  (Figure 1). The segment  measures
the territory located between each pair.  denotes the total amount of
territory controlled by each population ,s ot h a t :
 +  +  =3  (1)
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
The territory between each pair of populations  and  is valuable to them
because it contains resources (land and other inputs) that can be used by
either  or  to produce output.6 Each unit of territory produces one unit of
output. However, in order to control some territory populations must spend
resources to build their military capabilities (weapons). Output can be used
either for consumption () or to build weapons (). Hence, population 
’s consumption  is equal to the territory it controls  minus its military
spending :7
 =  −  (2)
6To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the territory located between populations
 and  is of no value to the the third population  6=  , or, equivalently, that population
 is unable or unwilling to control any fraction of territory between populations  and .
Therefore, 0 ≤  ≤ 2 for  = . An economic interpretaion of this restriction
is that production in each territory requires speciﬁc inappropriable inputs that only the
local populations possess. A diﬀerent interpretation is that the "territory" between two
populations is a metaphor for a more general set of "common issues" under dispute between
those two populations, along the lines of the model in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009b).
7Notice that all variables are in per capita terms, as population size is normalized to
one.
7I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fc o n ﬂict and appropriation, the territory located between
populations  and  is divided between them in proportion to their military
strength. Speciﬁcally, if population i’s weapons are  and population ’s





( ) is an instance of a contest success function,i n c r e a s i n gi n’s
weapons  and decreasing in ’s weapons . ( ) can be inter-
preted as the probability that population  would win complete control over
the territory, should a war erupt between  and . For simplicity, we as-
sume that no actual war occurs, but that the territory is divided "under
the shadow of power": each population controls a share of territory equal
to what it could expect to win in case of war. In other terms, when there
is conﬂict and appropriation, the border between populations is determined
by their relative military power. For example, if population  has twice as
m a n yw e a p o n sa sp o p u l a t i o n, it will control 23 of the territory between
 and , while population  will control the remaining 13,a n dt h eb o r d e r
between the two populations will be at a distance
2
3





This technology of conﬂict is a special case of a ratio contest success
function in which population ’s probability of success is a function of


(Tullock, 1980).8 The function could be generalized to allow for a higher







 ≥ 1. As shown by Skaperdas (1998) in a diﬀerent setting, the parameter
 has implications for alliance formation. In general, a higher  would
strengthen the incentives to form alliances and unions. Here we abstract
from this eﬀect and assume  =1 9
8An alternative speciﬁcation, also used in the formal literature, is the logistic or diﬀer-
ence function, where population ’s probability of success is a function of  − .F o r
discussions of alternative speciﬁcations see Hirshleifer (1989) and Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas
(2007).
9In Skaperdas (1998) 1 is indeed necessary for the formation of stable alliances.
In our setting this is not the case, because of diﬀerent assumptions about conﬂict over
8How much territory will each population control? How much will each
population consume? We are now ready to consider equilibrium outcomes
under diﬀerent institutional arrangements. First, we derive equilibria when
the three populations form three independent sovereign states, and each state
acquires and defends its territory on its own. Then, we study how equilibria
diﬀer under various forms of cooperation, such as (a) a non-aggression pact
between two states, (b) a military alliance, and (c) a full political union.
3.2 Military Spending, Borders, and Consumption un-
der Alternative Institutional Arrangements
Three independent states
Assume that each population forms its own independent state. Each state
 invests in its own weapons , taking the weapons of the other two states
 and  as given. We assume that a state’s military capabilities are used to
set the borders with both enemies simultaneously.10 Each state  chooses 



















resources between pairs of populations and institutional characteristics of allliances and
unions. Garﬁnkel (2004a, 2004b) also studies models of alliance formation and conﬂict
where stable alliances may form when  =1 . In her analyses, though, a crucial role is
played by conﬂict over resource redistribution within alliances. We will return to the issue
of internal conﬂict at the end of this chapter and in the next section.
10This assumption is reasonable given that no actual wars take place in our model, but
borders are set "under the shadow of power." If borders were determined by actual wars,
taking place simultaneously between all pairs of states, we would have to specify how each
state were to divide its military capabilities between its two fronts. In the symmetric case
of three independent states, each state would divide its weapons equally between the two
fronts, and the results would be unchanged. We will abstract from these complications
in the rest of the analysis, and always assume that a state’s military power can be used
against all its enemies simultaneously (a form of economies of scope in defense).
9In this symmetric equilibrium, all states are equally powerful, and each state
obtains half a share of the territory under dispute with each of its two neigh-
bors. Hence, each population controls a territory of size , produces  units
of output, consumes half of those units, and uses the other half to build












Clearly, military spending is a net loss for each population, as it diverts
valuable resources from consumption. The three populations would be better
oﬀ if they could commit to full disarmament (
 = 
 = 
 =0 ), while
dividing the world territory equally and peacefully among themselves. Then,
they would obtain the same land distribution as they get under conﬂict, but




ﬁrst-best outcome is not a Nash equilibrium: in the absence of some external
commitment technology, the three states cannot credibly commit to global
(multilateral) disarmament. In the rest of the chapter we will rule out any
multilateral cooperation, but will consider diﬀerent scenarios for bilateral
cooperation.
Non-aggression pact
Consider the possibility of a credible non-aggression pact between two
states (to ﬁxi d e a s , and ). That is, suppose that only states  and
 can credibly commit not to use force against each other, and to divide




). At the same time, they continue to use their individual military
capabilities to set territorial disputes with the third state (). In other words,
 and  can form a non-aggression pact, but not an active military alliance

































In equilibrium all three states spend less on weapons than they would have
in the absence of this bilateral non-aggression pact. Not surprisingly, the








equilibrium, interestingly,  and  are weaker than ,a n d ,a sar e s u l t , e a c h
of them controls less territory than in the previous equilibrium ( has twice
as many weapons as each of the two other states, and hence it controls 23
of the territory located between  and ,a n d23 of the territory between
 and ) O nn e t ,t h ep a c ti sag o o dd e a lf o r and . The loss of territory
to  is more than oﬀset by the gain in terms of lower military spending,


























In sum, a bilateral non-aggression pact allows signiﬁcant net savings in
defense spending, although at the cost of less eﬀective protection against
external aggression.
Military alliance
We now consider the case when, in addition to entering a non-aggression
pact with each other,  and  can credibly commit to join forces against
 while still maintaining their independence.12 Speciﬁcally, we suppose
11 also gains when  and  form a non-aggression pact between themselves: it obtains










12Here we abstract from the possibility that the two states can commit to join forces
against a third state, but are unable to commit not to attack each other. The issue of
intra-alliance (or, later, intra-state) conﬂict is an important one, and we will turn to it
later.
11that (i) military spending remains decentralized across states: each state
autonomously decides its own level of military spending and pays for it, but
(ii) control over territory is determined by the aggregate military power of

















 +  + 
−  (14)
Each state continues to choose its weapons taking the weapons of the other
two states as given. In particular, each ally takes the other ally’s weapons
as given, and does not internalize the beneﬁts that its own weapons provide





















is the same as the sum of the weapons of the two states when they only form a
non-aggression pact. Hence, a military alliance provides the same protection
against  that each state provided for itself when it was part of a mere non-
aggression pact. However, such military power is now obtained with a lower
level of military spending per capita. T h i si sac l e a ri n s t a n c eo feconomies
of scale in defense and security. Consequently, consumption is higher in an

























Notwithstanding such economies of scale, the alliance still provides only im-
perfect protection against .E v e nt h o u g he a c hs t a t ec a nr e l yo nt h es i z ea n d
resources of two populations, aggregate military power is "undersupplied."
This is an example of the well-known issue of free riding within decentralized
12military alliances, as each member fails to internalize the overall beneﬁts that
its military spending provides to the whole alliance (Olson and Zeckhauser,
1966). In order to internalize the full beneﬁts and costs of military spending,
the two populations would have to form a centralized political union. We
consider such an institutional arrangement next.
Political union
Finally, suppose that populations  and  form a full political union,
where decisions over military spending are centralized. The union’s military
capabilities  are decided jointly by the two populations in order to maxi-
mize their aggregate consumption, and their costs are shared equally within
the union. That is,  is chosen to maximize:






] −  (18)














Now the whole union controls a territory of size 2 (all territory between 
and , half the territory between  and , and half the territory between
 and ). This means that the union provides as much protection against
foreign aggression as an independent state (in the absence of a non-aggression
pact or a decentralized alliance). But now this protection is provided at





























 is higher than in any of the other three
arrangements (in contrast, population ’s consumption is the same as in the
13case when it is one of three fully independent states).13
In sum, in this setting a political union provides cheaper protection to
its citizens than they would get from a smaller sovereign state, and better
protection than they would get from a decentralized alliance.
3.3 Trade-oﬀ between Beneﬁts of Scale in Defense and
Heterogeneity Costs
We have seen that, in the presence of conﬂict and appropriation, cooperation
in security reduces the need for expensive military capabilities and/or spreads
their costs over a larger number of people. The largest gains are obtained by
forming a full political union, while more modest gains are associated with a
non-aggression pact or a decentralized alliance. Nonetheless, even though a
centralized defense is the most eﬀective form of protection against external
threats, these defense beneﬁts may not come for free. As we have mentioned
in Section 2, at the center of the literature on endogenous national borders is
the idea that forming a political union may entail substantial political costs.
When they form a political union, populations  and  may face a loss
of utility from sharing a common government, foreign policy, tax system,
and so on, insofar as preferences over public policies diﬀer across the two
populations. In general, whether a political union is formed will depend on
the trade-oﬀ between economies of scale in defense and heterogeneity costs.
Suppose that utility for each population  is
 =  +  (22)
where  is private consumption (as before), and  is the utility from the
services of a public good ("the government"). When population  is politically
13The fact that a political union provides a higher level of consumption to its members
relative to the other arrangements should not be viewed as a necessary implication of the
deﬁnition of a political union. Even though the political union indeed maximizes aggregate
consumption of its members, it takes the behavior of state  as given, and, therefore, does
not fully internalizes the eﬀects of its decisions over ’s behavior. In principle, a union
could end up lowering its members consumption (relative to alternative arrangements) if
state  were to react to the union’s formation by increasing its military spending to such
an extent that it would oﬀset the other two populations’ gains from forming a union. This
could happen, for instance, if  were to obtain much higher gains from conﬂict than either
 or  - in other words, if the gains from conﬂict were to be greatly asymmetric across
populations. We do not pursue these alternative speciﬁcations here.
14independent, it can choose its favored type of government, providing utility
. When forming a union with the other population, each population must
compromise and accept a less preferred type of government, providing utility


















 −  (24)










When non-aggression pacts and decentralized alliances are not available, and
the only choice available to the two populations is between full independence







 - i.e., if and only if the heterogeneity costs are smaller than the net gains









By contrast, if we assume that the two populations can choose whether to
form a political union or a decentralized alliance, the condition for a political
union becomes much more stringent:16
14In the literature on endogneous borders preferences over diﬀerent types of government
have often been given a spatial interpretation (for a discussion see Alesina and Spolaore,
2003, chapters 2 and 3; and Spolaore, 2006). For example, within our model we could
assume that each population prefers to locate the state’s "capital" as close as possible
to its own vertex ( or ), and that the capital of a political union is located at its
geographical center, half way between  and .
15For simplicty, we abstract from other beneﬁts from political unions, such as economies
of scale in the provision of non-defense public goods.  could re-interpreted as hetero-
geneity costs net of those additional beneﬁts.
16We abstact from heterogeneity costs in decentralized alliances. In principle, political
costs may also arise in a decentralized alliance, but they are likely to be much smaller, as










This implies that international changes that facilitate the formation of de-
centralized alliances will bring about the breakup of political unions with
higher heterogeneity costs (high ) or less at stake in terms of defense and
security (low ). In contrast, political unions with lower heterogeneity costs
(low )o rm o r ea ts t a k ei nc a s eo fc o n ﬂict (high ) will stick together even
when decentralized alliances become feasible.
Heterogeneity costs and domestic conﬂict
A very important issue is the extent to which alliances or political unions
actually succeed at eliminating conﬂict among their own members. In the
analysis above we have abstracted from the possibility that populations may
continue to use military force against each other even after they join an
alliance or a political union. Clearly, the net beneﬁts from forming a union
would be aﬀected if populations had to invest additional valuable resources
to aﬀect domestic outcomes in their favor. Such costs from internal conﬂict
over resources or public policies could be viewed as additional heterogeneity
costs from forming a union. For example, suppose that government policies
within the political union are decided by a "domestic contest" between the
two populations, where population  invests  units of output to build its
own domestic-conﬂict capabilities, while  invests ,a n d’s probability
of winning the contest is

 + 
. Assume that each population obtains
utility  if it wins the contest, but utility  − 2 if the other population
wins the contest and imposes its own preferred government policies. If no
resources are invested in domestic-conﬂict capabilities by either population,
each population has a 12 chance to have its preferred policies chosen, and, in
expectation, it obtains utility from government service equal to  = −.
Then, in the absence of domestic-conﬂict activities, the overall utility from









 −  (28)
as in the analysis above, when we assumed no domestic conﬂict. In contrast,
when both populations invest in domestic-conﬂict capabilities, overall utility





































That is, domestic conﬂict multiplies the losses from heterogeneity. In our
example, heterogeneity costs equal to  in the absence of domestic conﬂict
become 50% larger (
3
2
)a sac o n s e q u e n c eo fd o m e s t i cc o n ﬂict. This implies
that, for a given level of preference heterogeneity, a political union subject to
internal conﬂict would be formed only for higher returns from international
military power (in our setting, a higher ).
In sum, both international conﬂict and domestic conﬂict aﬀect the in-
centives to form a political union. To keep things simple, we have modeled
the two eﬀects separately: the extent of domestic conﬂict is not directly
inﬂuenced by the extent of international conﬂict, and vice versa. In more
complex settings, though, a larger external threat may directly aﬀect the
extent of internal conﬂict within a political union. More generally, in this
section we have illustrated the logic of the trade-oﬀ between economies of
scale in security and heterogeneity costs within a very simple framework,
abstracting from several variables and channels that may aﬀect the relation
between conﬂict and national borders. We will discuss some of those eﬀects
and extensions in the rest of this chapter.
4 The Political Economics of Conﬂict, Peace
and National Borders
In this section we discuss the connections between conﬂict and national bor-
ders in light of recent political-economy contributions. In particular, we
17consider analyses that have focused on systemic eﬀects when conﬂict and na-
tional borders are determined endogenously; the role of democratization and
international economic integration; and the political economy of civil conﬂict
and secessions.
4.1 International Conﬂict and the Number and Size of
Nations
The relationship between international conﬂict and national borders is stud-
ied by Alesina and Spolaore (2005, 2006). In those papers the equilibrium
number and size of nations is inﬂuenced by the need for government to pro-
tect the interests of its citizens in a bellicose world. Larger national states
emerge when national military power is more important in the settlement
of international disputes. In contrast, a reduction in the importance of in-
ternational conﬂict lowers the incentives to form larger political unions, and
brings about the formation of smaller, more numerous states.
Nonetheless, a decrease in the importance of military force may not reduce
the total number of violent conﬂicts in the world. When borders are formed
endogenously, a lower role for defense and security, by bringing about the
creation of more numerous states, can paradoxically increase the number of
observed instances of international conﬂict in the world. This is because,
even if the use of force is less likely in each speciﬁc international dispute, the
higher number of states raises the probability that some of those states may
engage in conﬂi c tw i t he a c ho t h e r .
Alesina and Spolaore (2006) show that a lower probability of having to
use force in international relations increases the number of nations in equilib-
rium, and can lead to an increase in the number of international interactions
that are resolved by force. Whether the total number of international con-
ﬂicts increases or decreases will depend on the average size of nations before
political disintegration. The actual number of international conﬂicts will
decrease only if the average size of nations before the breakup is already suf-
ﬁciently small. In contrast, the breakup of larger political unions tends to
be associated with an increase in the number of observed conﬂicts. A similar
eﬀect is derived for defense spending per capita, which may increase in a
world of smaller countries even as military power becomes less important in
18the settling of international disputes, therefore reducing or even eliminating
a "peace dividend" in terms of lower defense spending per capita.
Alesina and Spolaore (2005) study a more complex setting in which states
may engage in open wars, which entail direct costs in terms of havoc and
destruction, in addition to the costs of weapons, or may settle international
disputes through peaceful bargaining, where each state’s bargaining position
depends on its relative investment in military capabilities. Diﬀerent regions
may choose to remain independent or to join their neighbors in centralized
political unions. In equilibrium, the probability that wars occur and the
returns to defense spending are endogenously determined. Improvements in
the enforcement of national control rights over resources will reduce the need
for defense and force, and may therefore cause breakups of nations, possibly
leading to more wars in equilibrium.
4.2 Conﬂict, Democracy, and National Borders
The connection between democracy and conﬂi c ti sa tt h ec e n t e ro fa ne x t e n -
sive literature in international relations and political economy. Speciﬁcally,
as already mentioned in Section 2, this relation is part of the liberal peace
view that democracy and trade should reduce the risk of international con-
ﬂict. Nonetheless, the links among democratization, conﬂict, and the size of
nations are relatively unexplored.
The trade-oﬀ between costs and beneﬁts of national size depends not only
on the degree of heterogeneity of preferences but also on the political regime
through which preferences are turned into policies. Rent-seeking dictators
that are less concerned with the preferences of their subjects may pursue
expansionary policies leading to the formation of ineﬃciently large countries
and empires. In contrast, democratization raises the importance of citizens’
diverse preferences over public policies, therefore leading to more demand for
political autonomy and independence (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997).17
In addition, as documented in the vast literature on the "democratic
peace," dictators tend to be more willing than democratic governments to
engage in military conﬂict against their neighbors (for example, see Oneal
and Russett 1999, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, and, for a critical view,
17For a discussion of the relation between democratization and the size of countries see
also Lake and O’Mahony (2004).
19Gowa 2000). Then, democratization may lead to secessions and formation
of smaller countries for two reasons: because it raises the importance of
heterogeneity costs, and because it reduces the beneﬁts from military power.
An original theory of the shape and size of nations in a world of rent-
seeking Leviathans was provided by David Friedman (1977), who argued
t h a tn a t i o n a lb o r d e r si ns u c haw o r l dw o u l dm a x i m i z et h ew e a l t ho fr u l e r s .
Alesina and Spolaore (1997), in their formal analysis of endogenous national
borders, compare democratic outcomes (when borders are determined by
majority voting) with equilibrium outcomes when the number and size of
nations is determined by Leviathans who maximize their rents (as in Fried-
man’s theory).18 In Alesina and Spolaore’s framework Leviathans face a
"no-insurrection" constraint: in order to continue their rule, Leviathans must
maintain a fraction  of the population above a minimum level of welfare.
The parameter  can be interpreted as a measure of democratic responsive-
ness. An undemocratic dictator can ignore the preferences of most subjects
(12). As  increases, Leviathans become more concerned with larger
sectors of the populations, and gain relatively smaller rents when they extend
borders, because they must compensate a larger fraction of the population
for higher heterogeneity costs. In general, democratization (a higher ) will
be associated with smaller states in a world of rent-maximizing Leviathans.
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapter 7, and 2006) have extended this analysis
to study how democratic constraints interact with international conﬂict in a
world of Leviathans, and have shown that democratization has a smaller ef-
fect on borders at higher levels of conﬂict, while conﬂict has a smaller eﬀect
on borders at higher levels of democracy. In other words, in a very belli-
cose world democratization is less important in reducing the size of nations,
while in a more democratic world, international conﬂict is less important in
determining national borders.
4.3 International Openness, Conﬂict and Peace, and
Political Disintegration
The relation between international openness and national size has received
signiﬁcant attention in the literature. Less attention though has been given
18Economic analyses of the expansion of empires were also provided by Findlay (1996)
and Grossman and Mendoza (2004).
20to the connection between openness and national borders in a world of con-
ﬂict and appropriation, when conﬂict, trade and borders are all endogenous
variables and aﬀect each other in equilibrium.
Analyses of the size of nations have pointed out that the trade-oﬀ between
beneﬁts and costs of national size is also a function of the degree of inter-
national economic integration (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Alesina,
Spolaore and Wacziarg 2000, 2005; see also Wittman 2000 and Hiscox 2003).
Relevant economic size may or may not coincide with the political size of a
state as deﬁned by its national borders. Larger states mean larger domestic
markets when political borders imply barriers to international exchange. In
contrast, market size and political size would be uncorrelated in a world of
perfect free trade in which political borders imposed no costs on interna-
tional transactions. If market size matters for economic performance, small
countries can prosper in a world of free trade, while a large size is more
important economically in a world of protectionism. Empirically, the eﬀect
of size on economic performance tends to be higher for countries that are
less open, and the eﬀect of openness is much larger for smaller countries
(Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg 2000, 2005; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2005).
As international economic integration increases, the beneﬁts of a large na-
tional size are reduced, and political disintegration becomes less costly. Con-
versely, smaller countries tend to beneﬁt from more international openness.
Therefore, economic integration and political disintegration go hand in hand
(Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2000).
As in the case of democratization, an additional eﬀect of international
trade on the incentives to form larger nations emerges if economic integration
also reduces international conﬂict between trading partners, as argued by
the supporters of the liberal peace hypothesis (economic contributions on
the empirics of trade and conﬂict include, for instance, Polacheck 1980 and
Martin, Mayer and Thoenig 2008).
A study of the interconnections among economic integration, interna-
tional conﬂict, and the size of nations is provided in Spolaore (2004). When
conﬂict interacts with trade, multiple equilibria in conﬂict, openness and size
of political units are possible. Other things being equal, smaller countries
tend to be more open and less likely to engage in conﬂict. At the same
t i m e ,i naw o r l do fh i g ho p e n n e s sa n dl o wc o n ﬂict, political size will matter
less, therefore justifying smaller states in equilibrium. In another equilib-
rium, though, the world could be formed by larger political units, with less
international economic integration and a more prominent use of force in the
21resolution of international disputes. In such a world of higher conﬂict and
more protectionism, there would be higher beneﬁts associated with larger
domestic markets and economies of scale in defense and security. This, in
turn, will induce people to form larger political units in equilibrium. Then,
for given fundamentals in terms of productive and conﬂict technology and
preferences, alternative geopolitical outcomes are possible. In more recent
decades, the world has moved towards higher political decentralization, rel-
atively lower international conﬂict, and higher international economic inte-
gration. However, this analysis suggests that this same world, with the same
fundamentals, could take a diﬀerent path, with fewer political, military and
economic blocs, less open and more hostile to each other. In sum, the study of
endogenous national borders suggests that either development could be self-
fulﬁlling, and that international coordination of strategies and expectations
may play a crucial role in the determination of long-run outcomes.
4.4 Civil Conﬂict, External Threats, and Secessions
Civil and ethnic conﬂicts have been extensively studied by sociologists and
political scientists (e.g., Horowitz 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2003) and, increas-
ingly, by economists (e.g., Collier 2001; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005).
While most of these studies consider conﬂict within given borders, a few have
explicitly focused on ethnic conﬂict, reconﬁguration of borders, and political
partitions. In particular, Sambanis (2000) ﬁnds that, in general, partitions
do not seem to prevent recurrence of ethnic war, and writes that "[e]ven if
this solution reduces the incidence of internal war, it will almost certainly in-
crease the incidence of international war," an observation which is consistent
with the predictions of the models of international conﬂict discussed above.
For a general discussion from an international-relations perspective see also
Fearon (2004). In addition, some researchers have begun to investigate the
eﬀects of post-conﬂict partition on economic and policy outcomes, including
the provision of public goods; for instance, Swee (2009) studies the eﬀects of
the partition which ended the Bosnian War on the post-war local provision
of schooling.
An issue that is especially relevant from the perspective of this chapter
is the relation between external threats and internal national cohesion. As
mentioned in the Introduction, the idea that conﬂict with foreigners reduces
22or eliminates domestic conﬂi c th a sal o n gh i s t o r i c a lp e d i g r e e ,g o i n gb a c kt o
classical times.19 Does a higher likelihood of conﬂict with foreign enemies
r e d u c et h ee x t e n to fd o m e s t i cc o n ﬂict? If it does, through what mecha-
nisms? More broadly, what are the implications of the relations between
international conﬂict, civil conﬂict, and the formation of alliances and polit-
ical unions? Analyses of alliance formation in formal models of conﬂict and
appropriation (both within and across alliances) are provided by Garﬁnkel
(2004a, 2004b), who also studies the relation between external threats and
domestic conﬂict (Garﬁnkel 2004c). A theoretical analysis of the interaction
between inter—group and intra-group conﬂict is provided by Münster (2007).
A contribution more speciﬁcally focused on endogenous national forma-
tion in the presence of civil conﬂict is Spolaore (2008), who provides a formal
analysis of borders when secessions are the direct outcome of civil conﬂict
b e t w e e nt w or e g i o n sw i t h i nau n i ﬁed country. Spending on civil-conﬂict ca-
pabilities and the probability of secession are endogenous variables, which
depend on (a) the incentives to secede and (b) the incentives to oppose se-
cession attempts. Such incentives, in turn, depend on our familiar set of
factors: heterogeneity costs, economies of scale in the provision of public
goods, and the relative size of the two regions (a larger region, or "center"
and a smaller region, or "periphery"). In particular, Spolaore (2008) shows
that separatist conﬂict tends to be more intense when the two regions are
of roughly equal size, consistently with the empirical literature on civil and
ethnic conﬂict (e.g., see Horowitz 1985 and Collier 2001). In this context,
external threats do not necessarily reduce the intensity of separatist conﬂict
within a country. While external threats reduce the periphery’s incentives to
secede, they also strengthens the center’s incentives to resist the periphery’s
secession. This eﬀect may lead to more diversion of resources towards civil
conﬂict in the aggregate. Finally, the possibility of civil conﬂict over govern-
ment policies after borders have been determined (as in the stylized model
at the end of Section 3) reduces both the incentives to secede in the smaller
region and the beneﬁts from union in the larger region. In fact, the perspec-
tive of civil conﬂict over government policies may even induce a "secession of
the center." This is consistent with the general point that civil conﬂict tends
19For example, as already mentioned, For example, Sallust in The War with Jugurtha
wrote: "before the destruction of Carthage the people and senate of Rome together gov-
erned the republic peacefully and with moderation. There was no strife among the citizens
either for glory or for power; fear of the enemy (metus hostilis) preserved the good morals
of the state." (cited in Wood 1995, p. 177; see also Evrigenis 2008).
23to magnify heterogeneity costs and to increase the probability of secessions.
5 Directions for Further Research
An economics approach to conﬂict, peace and national borders provides in-
sights that complement the understanding obtained from more traditional
historical and political studies. Part of the value added from formal eco-
nomic analysis is the ability to model complex decisions and interactions in
relatively simple and stark ways, highlighting the logic of key mechanisms
and eﬀects. In this spirit, most of the political-economy analyses have been
conducted using stylized theoretical models.
A priority now is to bring these hypotheses and insights to the data, and
link the theoretical framework more closely with the historical record. This
is not an easy step, given the diﬃculty of collecting the relevant data and,
perhaps more importantly, of identifying causal relations when almost every
key variable is endogenous. Systematic empirical analyses of the connections
between conﬂict and endogenous national borders are still to be developed,
building on the vast empirical literature on the determinants of conﬂict and
wars.
An especially diﬃcult task is to measure relevant heterogeneity of prefer-
ences and characteristics across individuals, regions, and populations. Valu-
able information is provided by measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
introduced in the economic literature by Mauro (1995), but such variables
proxy only imperfectly for the extent and intensity of preference heterogene-
ity that are likely to aﬀect the determination of national borders.20 More
recent economic contributions have considered direct measures of long-term
cultural and historical distances across populations. Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2009a) have introduced a novel way to measure the eﬀects of long-term
cultural and historical relatedness on economic outcomes, by exploiting the
information from genetic distance among human populations. Desmet et al.
(2007) have provided an interesting empirical analysis of the connection be-
tween genetic distance and cultural distance, measured by diﬀerent answers
to a series of questions from the World Value Survey, and have argued that
20For a recent theoretical and empirical analysis of the origins of ethnolinguistic diversity
see Michalopoulos (2008).
24such measures can be used as proxies for preference heterogeneity, and hence
can shed insights on the stability of national borders within Europe.
A recent empirical contribution directly focused on the determinants of
conﬂict and wars is Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009b), who show that pop-
ulations that are more closely related genetically - and hence, on average,
culturally and historically - are more likely to engage in interstate conﬂict
and wars, even after controlling for a wide range of geographic measures,
measures of linguistic and religious distance, and other factors that aﬀect
interstate conﬂict, including trade and democracy. These ﬁndings as consis-
tent with a theoretical framework in which the degree of relatedness between
populations has a positive eﬀect on their conﬂict propensities because closely
related populations, on average, tend to share common traits and preferences,
to interact with each other more, and to care about a larger set of common
issues. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009b) also document that (i) the eﬀect of
relatedness are robust to controlling for trade and democracy variables, and
(ii) the eﬀects of trade and democracy on conﬂi c th o l de v e na f t e rc o n t r o l -
ling for relatedness. These estimates provide evidence against the premise
that closely related populations ﬁght less with each other, and show that the
pacifying eﬀects of bilateral trade and democracy survive when controlling
for measures of historical and cultural relatedness. This line of investigation
m a yh a v ei m p l i c a t i o n sf o rt h er e l a t i o nb e t w e e nc i v i lc o n ﬂict and heterogene-
ity within countries. More generally, the availability of these novel measures
of long-term relatedness, and the emerging evidence of robust links between
such measures and economic and political outcomes (including conﬂict and
war), point to a promising area for future research, with the potential to illu-
minate several issues and questions discussed in this chapter. An especially
relevant extension would be to study the determinants and eﬀects of conﬂict
- both within and across states - taking into account not only how related-
ness aﬀects conﬂict, but also how conﬂict and relatedness together aﬀect the
endogenous formation of national borders, and vice versa.
In sum, only the very ﬁrst steps have been taken towards a systematic
theoretical and empirical analysis of conﬂict, peace and national borders from
an economics perspective. This whole set of topics constitutes a fascinating
and promising area for future research.
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